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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
l)LAIN CITY IRRIGATION COMPANY,
Plaintiff
vs.
HOOPER IRRIGATION COMPANY,
a corporation, et al,
Defendants

Lynne Irrigation Company, Inc.
North Ogden Irrigation Company, Inc.
Western Irrigation Company, Inc.
Plain City Irrigation Company, Inc.
Utah State Engineer
Appellants
PETITION FOR REHEARING
Comes now The North Ogden Irrigation Company,
Western Irrigation Company, Lynne Irrigation Company, Plain City Irrigation Company, and the Utah
State Engineer, Appellants in the above cause and
respectfully petition this court for a rehearing in the
cause, for the reasons and upon the following grounds:

I.
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING IN EFFECT
THAT THE RESERVOIR CONTAINS TWO
CLASSES OF WATER - ONE CLASS BEING ALSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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LOCATED TO THE L.OWEi.R USERS UNDER PARAGRAPH 7 (A) OF THE DECREE, AND THE OTHER
CLASS NOT BEING SO ALL·OCATE.D.
II..

THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT r~rHE
CLAIM.S OF THE APPELLANTS, IF UPHELD,
PRODUCE AN INEQUITABLE RESUL.T.
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
FOR REHEARING
The fact that we are here confronted by a court
which is itself divided in its conclusions places a double
responsibility upon us as attorneys of the bar of this
court. First, the responsibility and duty of further
advocating the position of our clients, so ably stated in
the dissenting opinion of 11:r. Justice Callister, and, second, the responsibility of treading the narrow margin
between respect for the decision of the majority of the
court, and honorabl~e disagreement therewith.
The majority opinion, as we read it, rests upon two
propositions, neither of which finds support in the
record. The first is that the so-called "power water"
is water separate and distinct from the water which
the decree operates upon. The second is that to subject
the power water to the decree produces an inequitable
result which should be avoided if the decree n1ay otherwiS'e be reasonably interpreted.
This petition is limited to these t\YO points, and we
respectfully petition the court to give further consider2
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ation thereto to the end that the court, in seeking to arrive at what it conceives to be an equitable result, does
not deny the lower users that which is theirs as a matter
of la,v.
ARGUMENT

I.
OGDEN RIVER WATER USERS ASSOCIATION
HAS BUT ONE CLASS OF WATER, ALL OF
WHICH IS SUBJECT TO THE DECRE1E
At the outset the court should have it clearly in
mind that the so-called "power water", which has been
so designated sol'ely for the purpose of identification,
does not find itself from a source separate and apart
from the source of the other water in the reservoir. All
of the water comes from what the majority opinion refers
to as the "normal recharge of the basin". In the year
1959, this normal recharge produced a total of 30,915
acre feet, and it was all available for storage in the
res'ervoir. The power water was not in addition to this
normal recharge, but was a part of it. However, the
Power Company had the right to require the release
to it for power purposes of 15,015 acre feet of this
total. If this right were exercised the amount of water
ren1aining for the stockholders of the Association would
be reduced by this amount. On the other hand, if the
Power Company's right of release was not exercised,
the Association would have th'e full 30,915 acre feet.
Accordingly, and at the request of the Association, the
Power Company for a consideration of $1.28 per acre
foot waived its right of release, and the Association
3
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thereby became entitled to the ·use of the full 30,915
acre feet. The majority opinion speaks of this as being
"additional water purchased from the power company",
which we believe inaccurately describes the transaction,
but wh~ether it was in fact a sale of water, or a waiver
of a right, perhaps is not important. What is important
is that the water involved was not "additional" to the
normal recharge, but was a·part of the normal recharge.
Thus we believe that this court became, as was the lower
court, led astray by accepting th·e City's characterization
of the water as "additional water".
Another point which the majority must have overlooked, although the same has never been denied by
the City, is that th~e Association, in discharge of its
duties to its stockholders to attempt to provide an acre
foot of water per share of stock, is not limited to a
particular source, but has broad powers to obtain such
water from any source. And having obtained such
water it holds the same, and the whole thereof, for the
pro-rata use of its shareholders. No shareholder is
preferred as against others, but each share "is entitled"
(to use the language of the decree) to an equal pro-rata
share of the Association's water, which in the year 1959
was 30,915 acre feet. Thus we have the situation where
each share was entitled to 1/44,1'75 of 30,915 acre feet,
or approximately .7 acre foot per share, and the 4,500
shares we are here concerned with were entitl~ed to 4,500
x .7, or a total of 3,150 acre feet. The narrow question
then is "who is to receive the 3,150 acre feet represented
by these 4,500 shares~" Or, to state it another way~
"who is to receive the 3,150 acre feet to which these
shares is ~en ti tied"~
'4
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The lower court specifically found that the po,ver
water was "not subject to the decree", and we assun1e
that this court in affirming the lower court confirmefl
that finding. But if we accept th'e- premise, which even
the City has not denied, that the power water is water
which inures to shareholders of the Association the
same as any other water of the Association, then this
finding by th'e lower court fails, because the decree by
its terms operates upon all water of the Association
which inures to the Association's shareholders. Frankly,
we believe that if the decision of the lower court, as
affirmed by this court, is valid, it must be upon tire
ground that the decree does not allocate the power
water to the lower users, not upon the proposition that
the power "\vater is not subject to decree. This is probably what the majority of this court was attempting by
its emphasis upon the word "is" in the decree, rather
than excluding the water from the decre'e as did the
lower court. We believe, however, that the hidden fallacy in this premise likewise may be- demonstrated.
The decree by its terms provides then in exchange
for the water from the wells "the City set apart the
water to which it is entitled upon 4,500 shares of stock".
It further provides, "That the water represented by
said 4,500 shares of stock shall be distributed to the
water (lower) users". The so-called power water, as
well as any other water of the Association, is certainly
water "represented" by the 4,500 sharles, and is likewise
water to which the City "is entitled" under such shares,
because the City has no right to any Association water
except by and under its shares of stock. How then is
this power water allocated by the decree1 Is it to the
5
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lower users, as is other water, or is it excluded from
the allocation as held by th'e majority of this court 1
To exclude it from the allocation requires an interpretation of the phrase "is entitled" in the narrowest
sense, namely, in the s·ense of "the water then available", as stated by the majority, and this narrow construction is justified by the Court to the end of producing "a fair and equitable result". That is an absolute
non sequitur we will show under Point II of this Petition,
but we accept it for the moment to the end of showing
where the narrow interpretation of "is entitled" leads,
because if it is to be narrowly construed at all it must
so be for all purposes - not first narrowly and then
loosely to reach a desired 'end.
When the majority holds that the phrase "is entitled" relates to "the water then available', it means, of
course, that water availabl·e at the time the decree was
entered, namely, April 1, 1948. While the record is
silent as to the exact amount of water then available,
we doubt not but that the court will acknowledge from
·experience that the water "then available" was at its
lowest. The reservoir had been emptied, or substantially so, from the previous years' use, and the spring
run off was but commencing. The a1nount of water
"then available" was minimal, but the amount thereof
as of that date can be obtained from the Association's
records. Under this decision as it now stands the City
can from the Association's records determine just what
that amount then was in terms of acre f·eet (in fact it
was but 1,128 acre feet as shown by the Association's
daily storage records) and insist that it was but a prorata portion of this minimal an1ount of water only
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that \va~ allocated to the lower users under the decree,
and for which th~e City receives in return the year
round flow of 22 second feet from the wells. We are,
of eourse, satisfied that neither this court nor the ·city
itself intended this drastic result, but the majority
opinion of the court neeessarily puts the parties in
the position where it may be claimed.
Actually the decision as written extends even further than that. The majority of the court in allocating
the \Yater under the decree to that "then available"
further observes that "no future tense appears in the
language used and no reference is made to the future".
Obviously the purport of this language, even though it
may not have been the intendment of the court, is that
the allocation of water to the lower users was strictly
that water then available, namely, on April 1, 1948,
with no provision for the future and no provision for
future years. The result is that even an annual allocation to the lower users is denied, and they are held to
have had only the right to a proportionate share of the
water available to the Association on the date of the decree, and none ther:eafter. And this still isn't the end of
the matter, for the purport of the decision must be
pursued to its logical conclusion!
If the lower users are restricted to the allocation
of the water "then available", then what the lower users
gave to Ogden City "in exchange' therefor must of
necessity be likewise restricted, and what we have is
Ogden City receiving the right to the use of the wells
in the year 1948, and the lower users receiving an allocation of storage water in the year 1948. In other
7
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words, the decree provides not a permanent solution of
the problem at all, but only a solution for the year 1948.
We recognize that in thus presenting the matter
we may be charged with arguing the ridiculous, but we
submit that once the decree is limited to water "then
available", the consequences we have developed above
of necessity result.
What then is the answer' We submit it lies in this
court acknowledging by further decision in this case
that its narrow application of the phrase "is 'entitled",
to only such water as was "then available", was erroneous, and that some further interpretation must be
given .thereto. To do this the court must say that the
water the decree was allocating to the lower users was
not only the minimal amount then in the reservoir, to
which the shares were then entitled, but also some
further water the Association might in the future from
time to time acquire.
Certainly this is what the court intended, at least
as to water accumulated and acquired from the natural
flow of the river, but to make that intention manif'est
a further statement thereon is required of this court.
But once the court acknowledges that \Yater over and
above the miniinal amount in the reservoir as of the
date of the decree was in fact allocated to the lower
users under the decree, where can it logically stopT
Can it say that the additional "Tater which the decree
operates upon is only the flow from the river which
inures to the Association under Right Number 397 in
the na1ne of the United States~ How can it say that
and yet exclude water the us·e of \Yhich the Association
8
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aequired through agreement with the Power Company
under Right 37, or to any other water which the Association n1ay lawfully acquire~
We submit that if this court acknowledges, as
\Ve believe in fairness it must, that the decree is not
lilnited in its allocation of water to the lower users to
that a1nount of water which was as of April 1, 1948,
Hthen available", then the court must further acknowledge that the position of the lower users and of the
State Engin'eer throughout these proceedings was correct, and that there is no basis under the decree, either
in law or in fact, for saying that the decree allocates
some of the water of the Association to which thle
4,500 shares are entitled, but not all of the water to
"\vhich the shares are entitled.
That this does not result in an inequity to the
City which the Court sought to avoid we will now show.

II.
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
CLAIMS OF THE DEFENDANTS AND
RESPONDENTS PRODUCE AN
INEQUITABLE RESULT.
At the outset we would observe that the paragraph
of the decree we are here concerned with was entered
by the Court upon stipulation of the parties, and
whether it was advised or ill advised as to any party
is not presently of primary importance. As stated by
the majority opinion it is only where there is doubt
as to the interpretation of an agreement that questions
of fairnless and equity play any part in its interpre9
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tation. We will, accordingly, assume with the court,
but without admitting, that there is some doubt as to
just what the parties intended, and from there consider
the equity of the claim of the lower users as compared
to the result reached by the majority of the court.
We have already seen what may well happen to
the lower users if the majority opinion to the effect
that the decree allocates only water "th~en available"
remains unmodified. Under this decision the City may
well contend that it has heretofore been over gen'erous
to the lower users, and that hereafter by virtue of this
decision all they are entitl'ed to receive and will receive
(if any at all) is but a fractional part of some minimal
quantity of water, measured by the amount of water
actually available as of April 1, 1948. We assume
however that any possibility of that contingency arising
will be eliminated by further action by this court.
E!ven so, and assu1ning the right of the lower users
is extended to include each year all water available to
the Association under Right 397, equity is not done
by excluding water otherwise acquired by the Association. To get the matter in proper perspective an
understanding of the situation as of the time the stipulation was agreed to must be had.
For many years prior thereto the lo,ver users were
claiming the prior right to the flow from the wells, and
this claim had been the subject of long standing litigation between them and the City. The lower users
clain1ed the water for irrigation~ 'vhereas the City d~
sired it for eulinary purposes, as it was suitable for
drinking. To settle and to solve the matter in such
10
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a way as would enable the City to utilize the well water
for drinking purposes, and at the same time provide the
lo,ver users during the irrigation season with a comparable quantity of irrigation water, the parties agr:eed
to an exchange. To effect this solution the City agreed
to deliver to the lower users Association water, the
right to the use of which the City had by virtue of
-t,;>OO shares of stock the City held in the Association.
'"rhese shares were at all times to be held and maintained by the City, but the water thereunder was to
be released to the lower users. In return or "in exchange" therefor, the City was to have th:e year round
right to the flow from the wells (possibly limited during some 1nonths to 22 second feet daily average flow),
but notwithstanding such limitation, the right to the
use of in excess of 15,000 acr~e feet of water annually
fron1 the \Veils. In other words, with a full reservoir
in Pineview the lower users were to receive annually
4,500 acre fe·et of irrigation water, and the City up to
15,000 acre feet of culinary water. Certainly the City
\Vas not taken advantage of in that transaction.
But, says the majority opinion, if the City is required to participate, through the payment of assessments, in any special costs incurr:ed by the Association
in attempting to provide a full reservoir and a full
acre foot of water per share, an inequity develops
against it. With this we cannot agree.
Under the Articles of Incorporation of the Association ·each share of stock is entitled to its pro-rata share
of the fill of the reservoir.. As there are 44,175 shares,
and the Association capacity in the reservoir is 44,175
acre feet, each share becomes :entitled to a maximum of
11
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one acre foot. So unless it be assu1ned that the Association is going out and obligate itself for water in excess
of that which it has capacity to store, and to ass:ess its
present shareholders therefor, the maximum obligation
the City is under is to pay its pro-rata share under
its 4,500 shares of the cost to the Association of filling
the reservoir. Wher·e is the inequity and where is the
unfairness to the City in that~ In those occasional
years when the reservoir does not fill under Right 397,
and the Association acquires water from some source,
the City will be put to some added cost. But even
in those years the City is still getting upward of 15,000
acre feet of culinary water from the wells, something
worth i1nmeasurably more than any added costs to the
City incu~red in the acquisition of additional irrigation
water, particularly in years of short supply. To find
an in:equity to the City under those circumstances requires a finding of inequity merely because the court
conceives that the City made an improvident bargain
in agreeing to subject the water to "\vhich its 4,500 shares
are ·entitled to the use of the lower users.
Even if the court desires to assume that the Association might in the future in desregard of its duties
to its shareholders, and particularly over the protests
of the City, as the major shareholder, seek to obligate
the Association for water in excess of its reservoir
capacity and assess a portion of the costs to these
4,500 shares, the resulting inequity to the City would
be minor in comparison to the inequities this court
forces upon the lower users by its majority decision.
Let's examine that side of the coin.
12
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The court recognizes, of course, that the wells in
question are fed from an artesian basin lying beneath
'rhat is now Pineview Reservoir. This basin gets its
reeharge from the flow of Ogden River.
The first
run off each year of necessity goes to the recharge of
the basin, and it is only after the basin gains its recharge
that surplus run off develops for storage in the reservoir. Thus in a short year like 1959 the basin is
filled and the City gets its full supply from the wells,
and it is only the storage that suffers the shortage.
Thus the preferment in every year is in favor of the
City, and the weighing of the preferment the City gets
through having the water from the wells, as against
the occasional added annual charge to the City, demonstrates that the benefits to the City far exceed the
burdens.
One further point should perhaps be commented
upon. The majority opinion attribut es significance
to the fact that some of the lower users are shareholders
in the Association and as such are in a position to encourage the Association to buy additional water. By
the same token the City is a shar eholder to the extent
of 10,000 shares and in a far better position to discourage any such purchase. The court does not comment upon the size of the share holdings of the lower
users as compared to those of the City, and indeed we
doubt that it is a part of the record, but we can assure
the court, for what it is worth, that the aggregate
holdings of the lower users is but a fractional part of
the holdings of the City.
1

1
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CONCLUSION
We strongly urge that the majority of this court
erred in its conclusions in this rna tter, first, in holding
that the decree operated to allocate to the lower users
only water "then available", and did not extend to
water subsequently acquired in the year 1959 for the
purpose of augumenting the then short supply, and,
secondly, in permitting its interpretation of the meaning
of the decree to be influenced by what it conceived to
be equities in favor of the City.
While we have attempted to present our own views
with cogency, we have intended no offense to those
who may still disagree with us. Petitions for rehearing are to the writer among the more difficult tasks he
called upon to perform, as they are of necessity directed
against the logic and reasoning of members of thls
court. We may, however, and do on occasion, honestly
disagree with this court, but such disagreement affects
in no way our respect for those who judge us, and it
is in that spirit that this petition is presented. We
respectfully request that it be granted.
Respectfully Submitted,

HOWELL, STINE & OLMSTEAD
By NEIL R. OLMSTEAD
DAVID K. HOLTHER
WALTER L. BUDGE
Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellants
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